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SUMMARY 
Reputedly reliable sounding rocket propulsion systems 
have occasionally experienced motor failures with the 
attendant waste of time, effort, and money. Presented 
herein is an approach which culls past rocket failure data 
for an organized failure modes attack on rocket motor 
malfunctions. The life history of a rocket motor is used 
to fe r re t  out failure modes and thereby raise  the level of 
reliability. 
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SOUNDING ROCKET RELIABILITY 
REASSESSMENT 
by 
Abrom Hisler 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
Succinctly stated, a sounding rocket car r ies  scientific instruments into the upper atmosphere 
for observation and measurement purposes. The cost of the rocket covers not only the rocket 
vehicle but a lso the research instrumentation, logistic and operational support, and personnel ex- 
penses. That this cost not be wasted requires reliable instrumentation, vehicles, and propulsion 
systems. 
Also required is a continuing need to focus attention on the rocket's level of reliability so that 
it in no way deteriorates. This paper then discusses an approach for reassessing the reliability 
of a given solid propellant propulsion system. 
REASSESSMENT OF REPUTEDLY RELIABLE MOTORS 
Rocket motors a r e  selected for sounding purposes after a high level of reliability has been 
demonstrated by past launch and flight experience. Occasionally, rocket motor failures have oc- 
curred with these reputedly reliable motors. In view of the high costs and the time and effort 
involved, sounding rocket propulsion systems must be continually reassessed for reliability. This 
analysis may be performed prior to a flight attempt or after the failure of a reputedly reliable 
motor. In the former situation, an imminent failure is assumed so that some action can be taken 
to forestall an actual launch and flight failure. A leading question would be, "Have all modes of 
failure been considered in the reliability scheme?" To do so requires a certain vigilance to pre- 
vent new defects from creeping into the motor assembly or components; an  a le r t  reliability or- 
ganization (Reference 1) is necessary at all times. As  familiarity with the nature of the quality 
control organization (Reference 2-4*), the motor fabrication and assembly, and the motor drawings 
increases, $D does confidence in the motor's reliability. 
On the other hand, the failure of a reputedly reliable motor requires additional effort to 
troubleshoot that failure and determine the cause(s). These causes possibly could be found by a 
*See also:  Miller, Robert, "Trip Report: Discussion of Various Reliability and Quality Assurance Aspects of the Propulsion Portion 
of the WASP-MECA Project, " NASA Lewis Research Center, Office of Reliability and Quality Assurance, January 15, 1963. 
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close analysis of the design drawings; a search of the reliability and quality control organization 
to uncover poor inspection where inadvertent omission, or  commission, has occurred; and a study 
of the possible existence of new or different circumstances of operation. It is usually this last 
study which proves most worthwhile. 
When a rocket is operating under a different set of circumstances than it did previously, a 
more severe environment may be involved. This environment could combine various levels of 
operation so that new temperature, pressure, and force differentials must be considered simul- 
taneously. Temperature differentials may lead to motor failures because of thermal expansion 
when there  is insufficient component clearance and especially when the adjacent materials are 
dissimilar. The pressure  differential is another problem; this differential, in one instance, made 
igniter res ta r t  difficult at high altitudes. This condition a rose  because the pressure differential at 
the upper altitudes, greater thanthat experienced during the igniter sea level tests, caused struc- 
tural  damage to the igniter housing (Reference 5). 
Operating at higher G levels and vibration levels introduces higher force differentials which 
can be sufficiently above the cri t ical  level to produce motor failures. Higher G level considera- 
tions have led to the grain structure collapse theory (Appendix A), and consequently to additional 
design considerations. 
Somewhat related to  temperature, pressure,  and force differentials as failure modes are the 
time differentials of temperature and pressure,  or the ra te  of application of heat and pressure.  
Thermal shock thus may be explained in te rms  of the time interval required to build up to a 
certain magnitude of the temperature differential. Igniter blast is also an example of the very 
low rate of heat transfer to the grain surface; there is insufficient time to ignite the propellant 
despite the very hot ignition gases flowing by. High rates of pressurization occur when the burn- 
ing surface of the grain is increased above the critical burning surface area.  This a rea  value 
depends to a large extent on the ability of the case to withstand not simply proof pressures  but 
a lso these rates of pressurization. 
It is therefore advisable to consider design drawings of rocket motor systems, assemblies, 
and components f rom the viewpoint of differentials and rates of application of temperature (heat), 
pressure,  and force. Many failure modes experienced in the past could have been predicted with 
this type of analysis. 
T H E  FAILURE M O D E  APPROACH 
In the attempt to uncover the causes of motor failure, it is reasonable to assume that, for a 
successful launch and flight, no mode of motor failure has occurred. What may not be as obvious 
is the importance of focusing attention on all modes of possible failure. This, then, is the failure 
mode appyoach to solid motor reliability reassessment.  The basic problem may be stated, 
"Where and how have modes of failure crept into a rocket motor because of quality control 
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breakdowns, o r  during new conditions of operation?" 
tention to detail. 
And the answer requires constant at- 
Only recently has appreciation developed for the massive amount of failure data gathered in 
the solid propellant rocket motor field (References 2 and 6): The present trend in other allied 
fields of aerospace emphasizes attention to failure modes and their obvious direct  adverse effect 
on system reliability. From the failure data it is possible to gather and arrange the possible 
modes of failure in te rms  of where they may creep into the life cycle of the motor. This presents 
an organized framework of reference for  a particular motor's history, covering: (1) familiarity 
with the motor design drawings; (2) the trouble areas encountered in the development program 
which may again arise as recognized particular modes of failure in the production and assembly 
of the motor unit; (3) unusual delivery, storage, and handling occurrences; (4) the prelaunch 
preparations; and (5) the par ts  examination of the motor unit which failed, if  recovered. 
What is the best way to review a rocket motor design after a failure? It undoubtedly would 
include a review of the initial requirements for the motor, the manner in which these require- 
ments were incorporated into the motor specifications and drawings, and the manner in which the 
operating conditions of the motor which failed call for more stringent o r  additional requirements. 
A drawing analysis should consider the interrelation of the parts.  The propellant l iner is a case 
in point: Poor liner bonding at the grain end could lead to poor insulation of the grain with sub- 
sequent grain restriction failure, thus resulting in an excessively high propellant area being ex- 
posed to burning and, finally, motor overpressurization and blow. 
Modes of failure usually become evident when trouble a reas  in rocket motor development 
programs are overcome successfully. Too often the same trouble areas recur  again and again, 
in more than one development program, and their t rue nature is not understood until a previously 
known mode of failure is recognized. 
Inspection cr i ter ia  employed during production must cover failure modes which might creep 
in as a result  of changes in personnel (Reference 7), sources of supply, design, production tech- 
niques, and materials. Otherwise, the normally reliable motor may fail. 
The same holds t rue during the storage, handling, and delivery stages of a motor. Tempera- 
ture storage limits must be maintained, shipping containers employed at all times, and manufac- 
turer ' s  manuals consulted. 
Prelaunch preparations should also include (1) knowledge of the data of the last motor inspec- 
tion-possibly at the test site (with the possibility of returning the motor to  the manufacturing 
facility €or a complete inspection), and (2) the basis on which a motor is accepted after an inspec- 
tion. These motor acceptance criteria may be modified for  a specific motor. 
After a launch attempt and flight failure, the nature of the failure may be discovered by con- 
sidering the sequence of events. This sequence starts with the initiation of the igniter, which 
must have sufficient confinement and produce a satisfactory energy flux. The propellant surface 
composition must be sufficiently sensitive to  the energy flux emitted; and the propellant grain, as 
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it burns, must be sufficiently sound structurally not to  break up prematurely and present too large 
a propellant surface to burning. The chamber must be sufficiently strong to contain the developed 
pressure and temperature, and the nozzle must maintain its structural integrity and fixed throat 
area. 
If the motor par t s  are recoverable, then metallurgical tes ts  may reveal where the motor has 
failed. 
A troubleshooting worksheet has been included in this report  (Appendix B) to demonstrate the 
manner in which a necessary sequence of events can be used as a framework of reference in the 
attempt to run down the modes of failure responsible for a particular motor failure. Appropriate 
questions and suggested courses of action can be added to the worksheet. 
AN UP-TO-DATE FAILURE MODE CHECKOUT 
To keep track of the very many possible modes of failure requires great care and attention 
to detail, as previously noted. A checklist of all known failure modes should be prepared, and it 
should be updated with newer failure modes as they arise (References 8-13). A start in this di- 
rection has been made by incorporating Appendix C, "Checklist of Failure Modes," into this report. 
It is easy to run down a list of failure modes to inquire which mode is present in the motor 
under consideration. But a faster appraisal of possible failure modes can be made by arranging the 
modes as shown in this checklist. Often the nature of the motor failure gives a general hint of 
the particular failure mode and indicates whether it involves the general motor assembly or a 
specified component. In Appendix C the failure modes a r e  organized in this manner. This point- 
by-point checkout for possible modes of failure is not as simple as it may appear; it requires 
familiarity with the motor fabrication techniques, assembly sequence of the motor assembly, and 
component drawings. The very basic problem of detecting a particular failure mode also is in- 
volved (Reference 14). Each failure mode may call for a different detection technique which could 
include the disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of rocket motors similar to the one which 
failed; selective nondestructive tests;  metallurgical techniques; experimental s t r e s s  analysis 
procedures; and chemical analysis. The tabulation of Appendix C has the dual advantage of includ- 
ing not only new failure modes in their respective listings but also new failure mode detection 
techniques, with associated references for both the mode and the technique. In this way, the check- 
list may be kept up to date by systematically gathering available information on past failure modes 
and present detection techniques. 
Appendix C (and the Appendix B worksheet) also can be used as a springboard for pertinent 
queries on motors which have failed in te rms  of specific failure modes which may be under suspi- 
cion. When used with motor drawings and the motor's assembly sequence, the checklist also can 
highlight possible design e r ro r s .  In short, Appendix C can be applied for improved motor design, 
improved quality control, forestalling launch and flight failures via inspection checklists for engi- 
neers  and mechanics, and troubleshooting in te rms  of the required sequential performance of the 
motor and its components. 
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In regard to design, the essential purpose is to remove modes of failures and thereby design 
reliability into systems. To do this, the possible gauntlet of failures which a r e  apt to creep in 
must be kept foremost in the designer's mind. These failures must also be passed on to quality 
control organizations; and there must be constant feedback among the design, quality control, and 
troubleshooting people. The Appendix C checklist may provide the means to establish this neces- 
sa ry  communication. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION TO DESIGN OUT SUSPECTED FAILURE MODES 
With failure modes sifted and appropriate detection techniques employed, the nature of the 
failure may be surmised and a theory evolved. This may require consultation with an ever- 
expanding ar ray  of specialists (Reference 15) most familiar with their particular areas-welding, 
materials (igniter charge, propellant, liner, throat material), component design, assembly in- 
spection, etc. Here, again, queries prompted by possible modes of failure and directed to these 
specialists should develop the necessary corrective action after a coordinated design concept 
review. This coordination must "permit effective communication and proper liaison scheduling, 
be to the point, and be adequately funded and recorded" (Reference 16). The cost  of this approach, 
when successful, undoubtedly will be less  than the consequences of another launch and flight 
failure. 
The focal point of this approach to the reliability reassessment of sounding rockets, then, is 
to design reliability into the rocket by designing out assumed or known modes of failure. These 
would be the modes of failure which, for  the most part, already have been experienced in the past. 
Appendix D; a failures study chart, has been developed to present a fast rundown on a particular 
failure, the assumed failure modes, and the corrective action taken, with consequences. 
Certainly, employing the above systematic approach should increase one's confidence in the 
success of subsequent sounding rocket launches and flights. In the final analysis, the success or  
failure of a sounding rocket mission is a reflection, not on the sounding rocket itself, but on the 
adequacy of the prelaunch effort and judgment expended. 
(Manuscript received May 19, 1964) 
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Appendix A 
The Thinning Grain Structure Collapse Theory 
This theory assumes that a peculiar combination of factors causes solid rocket motor blows 
during flight when the motor operates satisfactorily until just prior to  burnout. These factors 
may on the one hand tend to reduce the throat area, and on the other to suddenly increase the 
propellant surface area. Loose components such as the resonance rod assembly, spring, and 
grain splinters would tend to block the throat. Increased surface a rea  could be produced by a 
sudden collapse of the thinning grain structure prior to burnout. Various forces acting on the 
grain structure could account for the grain collapse: 
1. The vehicle's acceleration; 
2. The compressive force of the spring, were one used, to immobilize the grain; 
3. The whipping action of resonance rods against thin web propellant; 
4.  Incipient combustion instability. 
The exact mechanism by which this grain collapse is achieved may be "hinted at" in the pres- 
ent l i terature which discusses how the integrity of propellant grain structures is adversely affected 
(References 17- 19). 
It is the grain geometry o r  the distribution of the propellant weight which most markedly deter- 
mines the ability of the grain structure to resist buckling and collapse. This in turn determines 
whether the critical burning surface a rea  has been exceeded and whether a blow will occur. The 
extent to which the critical burning surface is approached may very well decide the fate of a par- 
ticular motor. In short, a premature collapse of the grain structure results in a blow because of 
the unusually large amount of exposed propellant surface area inside the operating chamber. 
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Sustainer Trouble- Shooting Layout* 
CL 
KI Command signal mechanism b Was separating charge fired? b To sever interstage structure? 
Was succeeding stage ignited? - To force expended stage to separate by 
exhausting directly into the interstage 
compartment? 
L I 
Igniter resistance (amp/ohm) 1, Fluctuations below required amperage? 
v 
I 
I 
L Electrical source reliable? 
4 sqkbs/parallel 
Initiator powder 4 Blackpowder + Proprietary powder -p Tests/Naval Propellant Plant t 
1 
soli; grain propellant - 
b Degradation w/time ? Affected by humid conditions? 
I 
What was nature of conditiontng prior 
to launch? 
+Effective at all altitudes up to 200,000 feet 
Attitude of vehicle at time of malfunction? 
Test of igniters at sea level and desired altitude. 
Test of entire unit at sea level and desired altitude. 
Comparison of altitude test conditions w/malfunction conditions. 
-+ Solid grain propellant insensitive to igniter? $ 
*Discussion: The sequence of necessary events is shown on the extreme left starting with the operation of the command signal mechanism and ending with the sustained 
combustion of the solid grain propellant. Appropriate questions and applicable references for further study are inserted along this sequence in the attempt to identify the 
point at which the sequence was broken. In this particular case, in answer to the question “Was the separating charge fired?” the answer i s  =No” since the vehicle pre- 
maturely broke up before this stage of the sequence. 
TJANAF 1959, Vol. 7 ,  p. 4. 
tJANAF 1959, Vol. 7, p. 5 5 .  
Appendix C 
Checklist of Failure Modes 
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(1) Rocket Motor Assembly* 
Failure Mode 
Improper assembly 
Unsoldered w i r e  
Bolt failure 
Excessive 
temperature of motor 
a t  high altitudes 
Improper torquing 
O-ring difficulties 
Leak 
Faulty weld 
Design problems 
Materials problems 
I Improper modifications 
Comment 
Dimensional discrepancy 
Inadvertent omission of component 
Low thread count 
Mismatched units 
Under- o r  over-torqued 
Structural failure 
Overheated t 
Without locking device 
Vacuum insulation at high altitudes 
reduces the heat discharge to possibly 
overheat cri t ical  components 
Loose assembly of components 
Damaged 
Missing 
Improperly inserted 
Poor material 
Imperfections 
Crack in weld 
O-ring failure 
Gas retained in material  after inspection 
Contamination as a result  of processing 
Faulty material 
Uncured plastic 
Material imperfections 
Improper choice of materials 
with gas 
I 
Detection Mode 
Torque test  
Burnthrough at weld 
X ray 
zyg10** 
Corrective Action 
Torque wrench 
Reference 
'Discussion: The failure modes are  l is ted under: (1) Rocket motor assembly, (2) Igniter, (3) Propellant, (4)  Liner, ( 5 )  Rocket mota  case,  (6) Resonance rods, (7) Nozzle, and 
(8) Forward and af t  enclosures. 
referenced for further detailed information. 
As additional failure modes are known, they would be inserted in the appropriate l i s t  with any appropriate comments, detection mode employed, corrective action taken, and 
The growing l i s t  of failure modes would be used to  pinpoint more readily the plausible failure modes for a specific motor failure. 
tAlthough thrust reversal, thrust vector control (TVC), and safe-arm systems are not fully included in this  initial listing, inadequate protection of bolts from the jetavator blowback 
$Hider ,  A,, "Naval Propellant Plant  Travel Report," Goddard Space Flight Center, August 9, 1963. Liaison with F. Portner and V. Hart. 
caused the failure of a TVC system. 
"Zyglo technique based on use  of dye penetrant; rolled welds permit poor detection. 
(2) Igniter 
Detonation of igniter 
Low heat concentration of 
charge 
igniter gases 
I Failure Mode Comment Detection Mode Corrective Action Reference 
I 
(Comparable to igniter blast) 
Broken circuit Externally and internally 
I 
Igniter blast Igniter charge detonation 
Excessive ignition peaks 
to ignite blackpowder 
cause structural damage to igniter 
housing 
, ' Cracked grain 
High altitude non-ignition , Insufficient pressure at ignition altitude 
, Pressure differential great enough to 
Igniter pellet breakup 
Insufficient confinement* 
I Tendency of pellets to crumble 
Electrical continuity 
check 
20 
( t )  
5 
(t) 
Reinforced igniter (ti 
housing or  igniter 
basket 
20 
*Related to high altitude malfunction. 
tHisler, op. cit. 
(3) Propellant 
Failure' Mode 
Insensitive grain surface 
Propellant softening on 
aging 
Poor inhibition 
Grain shrinkage 
Deformation 
Excessive propellant 
burning rate 
Grain breakup 
Heterogeneous propellant 
Comment 
Silicone adhered to grain surface upon 
mold release of grain to change 
mixture ratio a t  surface 
Softened propellant underwent viscous 
flow into nozzle 
Inhibitor absorbed nitroglycerine (NG) 
Delamination of inhibitor 
Breakup of grain surface because of 
pressure differential behind grain 
(gas seepage) and within combustion 
zone t 
Increased brittleness of grain and 
inhibitor, usually below loading 
temperature and on aging 
During aging, storage, flight 
pressurization 
Caused by ignition blast 
Crackst: may propagate to surface on 
pressurization as  a result of: 
Temperature aging 
Curve shrinkage 
Ignition conditions 
Early burning phase 
Malhandling 
Moisture 
Voids 
Flaws 
Presence of water 
Detebtion Mode 
Chemical analysis of 
grain surface 
Hardness test 
Chemical analysis for 
NG in inhibitor surface 
Non-destructive 
Ultrasonic 
Radiographic 
inspection: 
Isotopic I 
Visual: use of probe 
Chemical analysis 
Corrective Action 
IS appropriate 
Reference 
*Hislet, op. cit. 
tBurnthrough at forward end related to differential pressure and poor inhibition. 
$Grain cracking a s  a result of temperature cyc l ing  
(3) Propellant (Continued) 
Failure Mode Comment Detection Mode Corrective Action Reference 
Grain restriction 
failure 
Sagging grain 
Combustion instabi-Ay 
Firing at propellant 
brittle point 
Brittle failure of propellant 
Critical L/D value of grain 
Burning rate instability 
Insufficient insulation** 
Poor grain suspension may lead to 
cracked grains at lower temperatures 
and propellant liner separation 
Blackpowder charge 
Ineffective o r  missing resonance rods 
Absence of aluminum in propellant 
Poor propellant mounting 
Initiated by : 
To produce: 
Uneven web burning + premature grain 
Excessive pressure and severe pressure 
breakup 
oscillations 
Instability level affected by grain 
temperature and material lot 
variations 
Dependent on propellant formulation Batch test Zhange burning rate 
inhibition 
(tt) 
25 
26 
25 
25 
27 
* *  Propellant-liner interrelation. 
ttMiller, op. cit. ( see  footnote on p. 1). 
Failure Mode Comment Detection Mode Corrective Action 
Faulty liner bonding Poor bonding agent 
Thermal contraction below ambient 
temperature of loading* 
Insulation failure ' Insufficient insulation 
Problem of: , Design 
Proper material selection 
Adequate thickness 
Failure Mode 
Reference 
28 
6, 29 
Corrosion weakened case 
Presence of water? 
Insulation porosity 
Improper insulation 
Structural failure 
Chemical analysis I 26 
I 
Burnthrough 
~ ~ 
Comment 
Out-of-round case allowed water to collect 
in upright position to rust case w/time 
(5) Rocket Motor Case 
Detection Mode 
Case improperly heat-treated Hardness test 
Metallurgical study 
Result of premature heating of case I 
Corrective Action 
Close adherence to 
required heat-treat 
technique 
Reference 
(*) 
6 
6 ,  30 
* H i d e r ,  op. c i f .  
(6) Resonance Rods 
Failure Mode 
Nozzle blockage 
Grain breakup 
Missing o r  loose rods 
Comment 
Force of spring, holding grain 
against aft end, too strong 
aft end, too weak 
Force of spring, to hold grain against 
Whiplike action of rods 
Detection Mode 
'Hider, op. cit. 
(7) Nozzle - Exit Cone, Components, and Throat 
Failure Mode 
Design problem 
Improper assembly 
Delamination 
Improper clearances 
and gaps 
Port restriction 
Chamber overpressurization 
Porous condition of carbon 
throat insert 
Reduced material thickness 
Reduced nozzle throat area 
Severe erosion and/or fracture 
Comment 
Poor throat reinforcement 
Caused by differential thermal expansion 
Exhaust gases flow into gaps and 
clearances to penetrate nozzle componenl 
interfaces 
By freed or  flowing potting material 
Detection Mode 
Corrective Action 
Possible use of 
hydraulic system 
to reduce shock 
damage 
Corrective Action 
Reference 
Reference 
32 
33 
34 
35 
6 
(7) Nozzle - Exit Cone, Components, and Throat (Continued) 
Comment 
Failure Mode 
Detection Mode Corrective Action Reference 
~ ~~ 
Exit cone burnthrough 
Nozzle ejection 
Relative position of throat 
w/respect to chamber 
Comment 
Insertion of extension tube between 
chamber and throat may eliminate un- 
stable burning. This also is a good fix 
for the above exhaust gas erosion fail- 
ure mode, (Anglewise, the throat- 
chamber position may give r ise  to 
thrust misalignment.) 
Structural failure 
(8) Aft Closure 
Failure Mode 
Overtorquing of aft closure 
bolts 
Rupture 
Burnthrough 
Rupture 
Burnthrough 
Reference 
36, 37 
~~ 
Comment I Detection Mode I Corrective Action I Reference 
Caused by internal insulation failure 
and/or gas leak 
(9) Forward Closure 
Caused by insulation failure and/or gas 
leak 
I 
Appendix D 
Rocket Failures Study Chart 
21 
Rocket Failures Study Chart* 
Special Considerations ' 
and Comments 
Possible Modes 
of Failure 
Higher G level of sounding 
rockets 
High compressive force 
of grain immobilizing 
spring 
Longitudinal stringers in 
material induced initial 
longitudinal case failure 
Broken or  missing or 
loose resonance rods 
Large amount of pro- 
pellant in chamber at 
time of grain collapse 
Severe a i r  transportation 
conditions 
Whipping action of 
resonance rods 
Spring weight on grain 
Weakens thinning grain 
structure 
Weakens grain 
structure 
Stringers found in 
recovered damaged 
case 
Promote combustion 
instability and un- 
even grain burning 
Result of premature 
collapse of weakened 
grain structure 
Fang of modified Ajax 
launcher damaged 
Prematurely collapses 
thinning grain structure 
Increases forces applied 
Correctivc 
Possible 
Recommend new 
spring compres- 
sive force spec- 
ification: 850+25 lb 
Tighter quality 
control on case 
material 
Inspect for this 
condition prior to 
launch - prepare 
checklist 
Stiffen rods to reduce 
vibration amplitude 
Reduce spring 
magnified by acceleration to thinning grain structure weight 
Reduces undercut struc- Chamfer inner-step 
tural strength of thinning 
grain structure 
contour of case 
Grain structure undercut 
by sharp edge 
iction 
Zritique Selected 
:onsequences and 
Conclusions 
References 
24 
21, 24 
(tl 
30 
21, 24 
24 
24 
'R, 
*This chart could be expanded to record significant information as to the date, place, and nature of the failure. A running account could then be kept of corrective action a s  
ttiisler, op. cit. 
- 
g proposed, criticized, selected, and reported in followup reports (Reference 38). * 
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